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This  paper analyzes  the origin  and  causes  of the recent  economic and financial 
crises, mainly for the countries located in the periphery of the European Union (EU), as 
well as their evolution and transformation into social, political, and institutional crises. 
After explaining the differential impact of the crises on EU member economies and 
critically  analysing  the  unsuccessful  orthodox  neoclassical  policies  implemented  by 
governments and international institutions to try to manage and resolve them, we propose 
some alternative economic policy measures for the EU.  
Furthermore, we analyze how the economic policies developed thus far not only are 
unable to resolve the current crisis pattern but also actually entail a risk to the present 
democratic models by transferring the legitimate control over governments from citizens 
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1.- Introduction 
 
The starting point of the most recent episodes of economic and financial as well as 
political, ideological, and institutional crises (henceforth, referred to as “the crises”)
1, at the 
international level, is usually considered to be the explosion of the subprime mortgage 
bubble in the US. The consequences of that event still affect, with varied intensity, world 
economies  today,  as  the  world‟s  most  developed  economies  underwent  extraordinarily 
significant transformations in their productive and financial structures, thus transforming 
the overall global economy. The consequences include dramatic changes in the balances of 
power in political, social, and cultural (and, hence, institutional) structures
2 and, as a result, 
in the behaviour and legitimacy of the democratic systems of the most advanced nations.  
The transformation began when the bank (mortgage) crisis grew to an economic 
(production  and  employment)  crisis.  It  transformed  into  a  financial  crisis  as  the 
underconfidence grew, and excessive private debt bled into an excessive sovereign (public) 
debt crisis. The evolution from a private crisis, whose resolution, when affirmed, would 
imply a refoundation of capitalism (hence, a market crisis), to a public sector crisis, whose 
(non)resolution would cause the collapse of the model of social protection and  the Welfare 
State System, which some of the most developed economies enjoy (hence, a state crisis), 
has resulted in attention now being focused on the very serious structural problems that 
currently plague the economic, financial, political, social, and institutional systems.  
In  contrast,  the  implementation  of  the  orthodox  neoclassical  economic  policy 
recipes,  especially  in  European  economies,  has  highlighted  the  fact  that  the  belief 
onliberalised  and  deregulated  markets  as  almost  perfect  meritocracies  (wh ich,  as  the 
mainstream assumes, distribute rewards and punishments according to merit, abilities and 
behaviour), was nothing more than a myth. To an even more serious extent, this return to 
old neoclassical policies may have undermined, perhaps in a definitive way, the legitimacy 
of those social, political, and institutional structures that have proved unable to demand and 
assign responsibility, correct market failures, and apply the economic policies necessary to 
internalize externalities, distribute costs in a fair way, and correct financial, structural, and 
social  imbalances.  These  same  institutional  structures  have  also  failed  to  reveal  and 
                                                      
1 Other crises, such as energy, food, or ecology crises, although intricately related, will not be analyzed in 
this paper.  
2 Considering culture in its broader meaning, as an institution, attitude, or type of behaviour. For more on 
the relation between institution and culture, see, for example, Billing (2000).   5 
quarantine the application of those economic policies that had little or nothing to do with 
the present crises.  
In  this  paper,  we  analyze  the  origin  and  evolution  of  the  crises  and  how  the 
economic policies designed in all Western economies (especially the EU periphery) to face 
the devastating consequences for production, employment, and social wellbeing are unable 
to  guarantee  the  stable  and  durable  recovery  of  these  variables  and  are  incapable  of 
maximising the people wellbeing. Furthermore, these new “old” economic policies imply a 
dangerous  point  of  inflection  in  the  political  and  democratic  future  of  the  affected 
economies, with presumably very serious consequences.  
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we will briefly review the 
origin and evolution of the crises. In the third section, we will critically study the economic 
policies that have been implemented, mainly in the European periphery, to  combat the 
causes and consequences of the crises, and we will discuss the available alternatives that, as 
yet, have not been enforced. In the fourth section, we will analyze why the origin of the 
crises, their evolution, and, specifically, the economic policies implemented, implies, de 
facto, undermining the political and social models of the European economies, as well as 
the global model of European construction itself. Finally, we present our conclusions. 
 
2. The origin, evolution, causes, and differential impact of the financial and 
economic crises 
 
2.1 An evolutionary crisis 
 
It all started as a bank crisis. Its formal explosion stemmed from the burst of the 
speculative bubble created by the securitisation process of subprime mortgages in the US 
market;  although,  in  reality,  the  crisis  was  the  natural  consequence  of  the  practical 
concretion  of  a  Minsky  moment  provoked  by  an  oversizing  of  some  deregulated  and 
interconnected  financial  markets  and  by  the  confidence  crisis  inherent  to  any 
financialisation process (Minsky, 1982, 1986).  
The contagion to other financial and bank markets and to other economic sectors, 
combined with the liquidity problems caused by the accumulation of junk assets in the 
balance sheets of banks and financial institutions, quickly transformed the bank crisis into a 
financial one. This converted the original liquidity shortages into solvency problems that, 
once  again,  showed  the  close  relation  that  the  deregulation  and  dysfunctional  financial   6 
liberalisation  process  -and  its  most  obvious  consequence,  that  is,  the  transit  towards  a 
financial capitalist model- has established between financial and productive economy:, the 
crisis  materialised  in  intense  economic  contractions  that  generated  recession  and 
unemployment, thus transforming into an economic crisis.  
Immediately, the operation of the budget´s “automatic stabilisers”, which increase 
public expenses and collapse public revenues, along with ad hoc measures designed by the 
public sectors of the most developed economies to bail out troubled financial institutions to 
avoid  a  global  systemic  collapse  and  temper  the  dramatic  impact  of  the  social  and 
productive consequences of economic crisis caused (for instance in Spain) or deepened (as 
in  Greece)  public  deficit  difficulties.  Consequently,  this  was  accompanied  by  growing 
pressure on the public debt of the affected economies. In this way, the economic crisis 
became a sovereign debt crisis with unusual rapidity, transmuting its excessive private debt 
origin into a consequent excessive public debt.  
In turn, the debt crisis was transmitted in the form of tension in at least three very 
obvious directions. The first one was towards an exchange rate crisis, which involved a 
deepening of the persisting and systematic misalignments in the exchange rates of the main 
currencies operating on the global currency market
3. Fundamentally, this evolved from the 
elaboration  of  competitive  devaluation  strategies  and  the  implementation  of  other, 
commercial or not, beggar-thy-neighbour policies
4. The second direction was toward the 
feedback of problems associated with excessive debt, lack of confidence and credit access 
difficulty for the financial institutions of the affected economies (hence, deepening the bank 
crisis). Again, this is a consequence of the practical apparition of a peculiar  psychological 
crowding-out  effect,  according  to  which  the  levels  of  public  debt  in  countries  that  are 
basically  solvent  raise  doubts  among  (already  fearful  and  herding)  financial  markets 
regarding  the  solvency  of  the  private  financial  entities  of  these  countries.  Finally,  the 
draconian measures of structural adjustment that States and other supranational political 
structures  such  as  the European Union  (EU) offered to  financial markets  deepened the 
                                                      
3 Obviously, the problems regarding exchange rates are much deeper and go much further than persisting 
and systematic misalignments. For more on this specific topic, see Harvey (2009). 
4 The labour market deregulation policies implemented in some economies of the EU, by trying to reduce 
unitary labour costs to a larger extent than business competitors or by reducing public pension systems 
benefits, which avoid increasing employers‟ contributions and/or raising tax pressure on higher incomes 
(which are both alternative mechanisms to support the system by means of revenues increases instead of 
spending cuts), and, thus, avoid affecting national businesses‟ export competitiveness, can be regarded as 
another type of beggar-thy-neighbour policies, and not, as the mainstream points out, policies meant to 
improve competitiveness and efficiency.   7 
economic,  social,  and  political  consequences  of  the  crisis,  provoking  political  and 
institutional crises (as we will analyze in the next sections).  
This leads us to the question: what is the origin of such significant economic and 
financial crises? 
 
2.2 Financial, structural, and social deficits as causes of the crises  
 
Given  that  the  time  dynamics  of  the  events  are  well-known,  it  proves  more 
interesting to analyze the underlying reasons that explain both the eruption of the crises and 
the intensity that they reached within the most developed economies. In our opinion, there 
are two main sets of factors that could explain the recent episodes of the financial and 
economic crises: microeconomic factors and macroeconomic and structural factors
5. 
 
2.2.1. Microeconomic factors 
 
This group of factors is made up of three main elements:  (i)  the  existence  of 
distorted  incentives;  (ii)  the  presence  of  significant  and  persisting  errors  in  risk 
quantification  and  management;  and  (iii)  the  enormous  deficiencies  detected  in  the 
regulation and supervision of financial markets.  
Firstly, the crisis has highlighted the presence of distorted incentives for consumers, 
investors, financial agents, and  rating agencies. On the one hand, consumers and investors 
were not cautious enough and, consequently, got into considerable debt and invested in 
products that were too opaque and complex. Some factors intrinsic to the behaviour of the 
liberalised  and  internationalised  financial  markets,  such  as  the  existence  of  imperfect 
information, uncertainty, irrationality, bounded rationality, and herd behaviour (Dequech 
2001;  Dunn,  2001;  García-Arias,  2006;  Olesen,  2010),  explain  and  have  certainly 
demonstrated their unsettling potential in recent crises. On the other side, the managers of 
financial institutions, encouraged by remuneration plans based on short-term returns and 
turnover increases, raised the leverage and accumulated enormous risks. Finally, the rating 
agencies, overwhelmed by highly complex structured products but unable to give up the 
                                                      
5 The literature regarding this issue is abundant. See, among others, Arestis and Singh (2010), Becker et 
al. (2010), Crotty (2009), Dymski (2010), Gaffney (2009), Grahl (2011), Gills (2010), Hoogvelt (2010), 
Lapavitsas et al. (2010), Martins (2011), Mittelman (2010), Nousios and Tsolakis (2011), Thompson 
(2010), and Wray (2009).   8 
benefits  that  the  product  evaluations  would  bring  them,  did  not  accurately  assess  the 
probability of non-payment
6. 
On the other hand, we now know that, to quantify, assess, and manage risk, 
extraordinarily sophisticated tools based on long -term experience are required; however, 
these tools are inherently and dramatically imperfect. Considering that, even with series of 
data with abundant historical information, the belief that the economy was predictable led 
to an underestimation of the importance of past convulsions. In this way, the period of 
relative stability before the explosion of the crisis caused people to think that the risk had 
permanently diminished and that it could be managed in an optimum way, thus  suggesting 
that a financial version of “the end of History” had been established. However, as we have 
learned at a great social cost, quantitative methods fail, especially when valuing infrequent 
events on a large scale. Simply stated, the more we need quantitative methods, the less 
accurate they are
7. 
Finally, at this stage it seems clear that the public system regulating markets and 
financial institutions was too lenient and, as far as some activities were concerned, too easy 
to outwit. The excessive tru st in market discipline on the part of public regulators and 
supervisors led them to maintain minimal regulations in some of the key countries of the 
global financial system. Even in the economies in which the regulations were supposedly 
stricter, financial institutions did not have much trouble removing specific activities from 
the regulatory perimeter. As a consequence, regulators and supervisors allowed for the 
accumulation of enormous risks. There is no doubt that the triumph of the past decades of 
the mythological vision of the Efficient Financial Market Hypothesis, both in the most 
theoretical branches of academic research and in the most practical branches of daily 
operations  within  international  financial  in stitutions,  central  banks,  and  financial 
marketplaces, is partly to blame for the inadequate public regulations, as we will later 
assert.  
                                                      
6 Another possibility, regarding the operation and the historic behaviour of these agencies, is that they 
knew  the  risks  of  the  products  they  were  evaluating  but  decided,  probably  due  to  compensation,  to 
collude with the financial operators who originated the toxic products to deliberately hide the real risk of 
such products. 
7 In fact, the origin of the problem stems from the well -known dichotomy in economic methodology 
literature (see, for example, Davidson (1991) or Ferrari -Filho and Conceicao (2005)) but  ignored by 
mainstream  Economics,  between  the  post -Keynesian  concept  of  uncertainty  (the  economy  is 
unpredictable,  and  we  lack  certainty  regarding  what  will  happen)  and  the  neoclassical  concept  of 
probabilistic risk (the economy is unpredictable, but we can estimate,  with a certain error margin, a 
reasonable approximation of what will happen). It is easy to see which of the two theories won, after the 
recent crisis.   9 
As  a  consequence,  the  combination  of  both  market  and    public  sector  failures 
allowed  the  financial  sector  to  profit  too  quickly  and  too  easily,  without  ensuring 
appropriate adjustments to risk.  
 
2.2.2. Macroeconomic and structural factors 
 
In our opinion, four large categories of macroeconomic and structural factors lie at 
the root of the present economic and financial crises: (i) the existence of problems related 
to the accumulation of international economic imbalances with respect, fundamentally, to 
the balance of payments; (ii) the difficulties deriving from a long period of low real interest 
rates; (iii) the problems that emerged from the long period of increased inequality in the 
income  distribution;  and  (iv)  the  triumph  of  the  neoclassical  ideology  in  contemporary 
economic thinking. 
Regarding the balance of payments imbalances, for most of the decade preceding 
the  explosion  of  the  crisis,  large  and  lingering  current  accounts  surpluses  and  deficits 
generated  net  flows  of  capital  from  emerging  countries  -in  which  capital  was  scarce- 
toward industrialised economies -where it was abundant. This caused significant economic 
effects  both  in  those  economies  with  external  financing  capacity  and  in  those  with 
financing need. Such effects included an excessive domestic demand in some of the most 
advanced  economies,  an  overabundance  of  savings,  scarce  investment  opportunities,  a 
demand  for  diversification  on  low-risk  international  assets,  etc.  However,  the  most 
important element, from our perspective, is the symbiotic relationship that was established 
between export-led growth in a certain group of developed economies and leverage-led 
growth for others, which generated large gross flows and enormous creditor positions on 
the part of exporting countries toward importing ones. These flows and these international 
positions contributed to the erroneous valuation of assets and to the propagation of the 
crisis across the world; as a direct consequence, they are the key factors in understanding 
the differential impacts on the main economies of the EU, as we will analyze below.  
The second group of macroeconomic causes was originated during the period of low 
long-term interest rates that started in 2001 and that had important effects, among which 
was the increase in granted credits in many advanced economies, causing the prices of 
certain goods to soar in an unsustainable way (a paradigmatic example of this was real 
estate in Spain). The low long-term interest rates led institutional investors to search for 
new profitable sources and to take additional risks. The implementation of this monetary   10 
policy allowed three pieces of the international puzzle of imbalances to fit together: (1) an 
overabundance  of  funds  available  for  loans  at  an  aggregate  level  (but  with  significant 
financing capacity in the cases of China, Germany, Japan, and several emerging countries, 
and dramatic financing need for countries like the US, Spain, the UK, Italy, and Greece); 
(2) the search, on the part of international investors, for apparently highly profitable assets 
in  countries  with  small  saving  rates;  and  (3)  an  attraction  to  risk  on  the  part  of  such 
investors
8. 
The third key element relates to the increased   inequality and concentration of 
income  and  wealth  distribution  over  the  past  decades,  during  which  the  neoliberal 
capitalism  model  evolved  (Martins,  2011).  Indeed,  the  triumph  of  the  most  radical 
postulates of neoclassical ideology has resulted in changing the balance of power relations 
between capital and labour, and in rising income concentration in the higher deciles of 
primary income and wealth distribution (Stockhammer, 2011). The increase in profits has 
not resulted in increased investments as expect ed, but the relative collapse in wages, has 
restricted workers‟ consumption and has provoked aggregate demand contractions at the 
international level, in addition to those caused by the restriction of public spending growth -
especially in social expenditures- stimulated by the decreased tax burden of business profits 
and  of  the  richest  tax-payers.  As  Kotz  (2009)  pointed  out,  within  the  neoliberalism 
paradigm, the problem could only be solved in one way, that is, by making the majority of 
the population consume above their income, and hence, by going into debt. Resorting to 
debt  was  possible  as  a  consequence  of  the  financialisation  and  deregulation  process 
associated with neoliberalism ideology, which allowed international financial capitals to 
flow in and fund current account deficits. This situation, in effect, links the problem of 
increased  inequality  with  the  problem  of  external  imbalances  as  previously  explained. 
Ultimately, the debt incurred as a result of the neoliberal deregulation process provoked the 
well-known “boom-bust” cycle that is characteristic of all financial crises
9.  
Finally, the fact that the neoclassical mode of thought became the hegemonic school 
in Economics has very important consequences and ramifications on the discipline as a 
whole
10. Regarding the crisis
11, this ideological triumph could materialise by elevating a 
                                                      
8 See Tugores Ques (2010) for more details. 
9 See, for instance, Held and Kaya (2007) for an analysis of the increase in inequality at the international 
level and García-Arias (2004) for an analysis of the  boom-bust cycle in the specific case of the 1997-99 
Asian crises. 
10 See Saad-Filho and Johnston (2004) for an excellent study of the implicati ons that the conversion of 
neoclassical economics into mainstream has had on the current evolution of developed economies.    11 
mere performative belief to an axiomatic rank: the Efficient Financial Markets Hypothesis 
and  its  corollary  more  related  to  the  issue  at  hand,  that  is,  the  implementation  of  a 
deregulation and dysfunctional liberalization process of international financial markets, that 
establish the definitive impulse for the transition from an industrial capitalist model to a 
purely  financial  one,  thus  making  possible  the  practical  performance  of  a  “casino 
economy”.  Some  of  the  most  plausible  and  dramatic  consequences  of  this  process  are 
related to a disproportionate increase in the resources exchanged on these markets, with the 
strengthening  of  systemic  risk,  with  the  recurring  presence  of  banking,  currency,  and 
financial  crises,  or  with  the  guarantees  that  national  public  sectors  and  international 
financial institutions have come to offer to the entire process, intensifying the problems 
related to moral hazard
12.  
 
2.3.  The  differential  impact  of  a  world  crisis:  the  case  of  the  European 
periphery 
 
If,  as  was  emphasised  in  the  previous  paragraphs,  the  crises  basically  have  an 
international dimension,, their clearly differential impact in some economies appear as a 
contradiction. Of course, this paper cannot analyze this fact for the international economy 
as  a  whole,  so  we  will  focus  our  analysis  on  the  differential  impact  in  the  EU  as  it 
represents, in our opinion, a category and not a mere anecdote.  
From our point of view, the differential impact of the crisis in the EU is the logical 
consequence of the existence of structural problems in the Eurozone, of the futility and 
contradictions of a purely mercantile and monetarist project of European construction and, 
consequently, of the absence of a real project of economic, social, and political EU.  
As it is well-known, since the Eurozone‟s initiation in 2001, an internal division has 
emerged between the centre -which we could well associate with Germany but which also 
encompasses Austria, Holland, or France-, and an internal periphery -which consists of 
Spain, Portugal, and Greece, and also, although with a different model, Ireland and Italy- 
(Lapavitsas et al., 2010).  
                                                                                                                                                             
11 See Lawson (2009) for a detailed analysis of the role that the triumph of neoclassical Economics in the 
academic  sector  has  played  regarding  the  emergence  and  evolution  of  the  crisis,  as  well  as  in  the 
elaboration of the “solutions” that were adopted by the majority of European economies to remedy its 
effects.  
12 See, among others, Agüera Sirgo and García-Arias (2000) and Toporowski (2011) for an analysis of the 
processes of liberalisation and deregulation of international financial markets and their most significant 
(and negative) consequences on the stability of the most developed economies; and García -Arias (2008, 
2011) for a study about the impact on underdeveloped and developing economies.    12 
This division within the Eurozone-in which the model of construction is based on a 
focus  on  super  competitiveness  and  efficiency-,  has  entailed  the  progressive  loss  of 
competitiveness at the periphery as compared to the centre. This progressive loss caused 
systematic current account deficits in the periphery, which are, in turn, an almost perfect 
reflection of the lingering surpluses in the centre, especially in Germany. As Lapavitsas et 
al. (2010) shown, the eruption of a generalised instability across the EU in mid-2009 is 
simply a reflection of these current account imbalances in the Eurozone, combined with the 
intense and very rapid growth of a deregulated financial sector over the past few years.  
In its least sophisticated version, the relationship between debt and current account 
balance is based on the basic macro-magnitude of an open economy with a public sector, 
that  basically  establishes  that  a  surplus  of  savings  as  compared  to  private  investment 
finances the public deficit and the external surplus or net external loans, which means that 
if a country imports more than it exports because it is not competitive abroad(i.e., if it has a 
current deficit), this external deficit must be matched by private and/or public debt.  
On  the  other  hand,  given  that  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  balance  of  payments´ 
equilibrium, including the current account and the capital account, if a current imbalance 
exists, it has to be funded by flows of capitals from abroad, which can take the form of 
foreign direct investment, bank lending, or portfolio flows. These three types of foreign 
capital  flows  are  different  in  many  respects,  but  the  difference  in  which  we  are  most 
interested is that foreign direct investment does not generate debt, whereas bank lending 
and portfolio flows do.  
In practice, in the Eurozone centre, growing current account surpluses have been 
produced  since  2001,  whereas  systematic  current  account  deficits  have  occurred  in  the 
periphery, which have been primarily funded with bank lending, mainly from German and 
French banks, and portfolio flows
13. 
Now, if current account deficits occur in the periphery, which have been basically 
financed by debt-creating capital flows, who has actually absorbed this debt: the private 
sector or the public sector? The answer is quite simple in this case. The three countries that 
represent the quintessence of the periphery within the Eurozone (Spain, Portugal, and 
Greece), but especially the first one, have presented public surpluses or only slightly 
significant public deficits over one decade (1996-2007), primarily because these countries 
have been privileged participants in satisfying the EU Stability and Growth Pact. This 
                                                      
13 See Lapavitsas et al. (2010) for formal analysis and statistic data.    13 
agreement has compelled European peripheries to import the fiscal conservatism of the 
European centre, which theoretically aimed at increasing import credibility and gaining 
confidence from international financial markets. The public deficits only appear from 2008 
to  2009,  basically  as  a  consequence  of  budget´s  automatic  stabilisers  and  of  the 
implementation of policies that stimulated demand, bailed out financial institutions, and 
covered the social impact of the crises. In contrast, bank lending, primarily from German 
and French banks, and portfolio flows increased exponentially.  
This suggests that the current account imbalances in the European periphery have 
been  matched  by  private  debt,  which,  in  the  case  of  Spain,  corresponds  to  an  intense 
increase in investments, particularly real estate, and, in the cases of Portugal and Greece, to 
a huge collapse in savings.  
In  short,  the  loss  of  competitiveness  in  the  European  periphery  has  led  to  a 
substantial current account deficit in these countries, which has been financed primarily by 
flows  from  abroad.  Despite  the  “white  noise”  from  mainstream  Economics  calling  the 
public sectors in these countries spendthrift and inefficient, the fact is that there was no 
public debt before the crisis reached a mature stage. In contrast, the current account deficits 
are associated with substantial private debt. That is, unable to compete with the central 
European  economies,  the  inefficient  peripheral  private  sectors  reacted  by  generating 
substantial private debt, which, in Spain, took  the form of a real estate bubble and, in 
Greece and Portugal, prompted a collapse in private savings.  
Moreover,  this  excessive  debt  situation  would  not  have  been  possible  without 
another nuclear element of the monetarist and mercantile EU construction process. This 
element results from member States deliberately opting for a process of financialisation and 
dysfunctional financial liberalisation, which was intensified after the introduction of the 
euro and which offered the private sector of the periphery the opportunity to cheaply go 
into debt due to the nominal interest rates of the Eurozone. 
In other words, the differential impact of the crisis in the countries of the European 
periphery  results  from  productive  inabilities  on  the  part  of  the  private  sector  in  these 
economies.  These  inabilities  have  been  covered  by  resorting  to  (private)  debt  and  are, 
ultimately, a direct consequence of the inappropriate design of the EU as a monetary and 
financial Union, but not an economic, political and social, Union.  
To summarise, the deficits represent the fundamental cause of the present crisis. 
Nevertheless, the ones being blamed are not the public deficits that the mainstream points 
to; rather, they are the financial deficit –the inappropriate processes of liberalisation and   14 
deregulation of international financial markets and the generalised use of debt in the private 
sector; the structural deficit –the triumph of the neoclassical ideology and the accumulation 
of  fundamental  macroeconomic  imbalances-;  and  the  social  deficit  –the  increased 
inequality in income and wealth distribution-.  
 
3.  Policies  applied  in  the  European  periphery  against  the  crises  and  some 
available alternatives 
 
The public interventions designed both at the national and the international level in 
response to the recent crises episodes have been varied, from a geographical point of view 
and from a temporal point of view. This complexity naturally explains why we cannot 
analyze these policies in detail and why we will only establish some focal points especially 
centred on the economic policy measures established in the European periphery from the 
beginning of 2010, which, in our opinion, align with an archetypical category.  
In general and in a necessarily simplified way, three main stages can be identified 
when examining the public responses to the crises: the first one would span the period 
between the origin of the crises until the end of 2008, when the basic objective was to 
prevent a systemic financial collapse from exploding. It entailed an emergency treatment 
and  the  administration  of  shock  measures  such  as  providing  direct  assistance  to  the 
financial system; low interest rates; expanding central banks‟ balances, assets, and liability 
endorsements  to  avoid  massive  deposit  withdrawals;  granting  direct  loans  by  tax 
authorities, central banks, and international financial organisms to allow for refinancing to 
avoid non-payment; giving capital injections to avoid insolvencies; nationalising financial 
institutions  so  that  bankrupt  institutions  could  continue  to  serve  their  clients;  and 
eliminating low-quality loans in the balances of the private sector.  
A  second  stage  coincides  with  the  explosion  of  the  economic  and  employment 
crises  and  extends  to  early  2010,  when  the  contraction  of  aggregate  demand  and  the 
freezing of economic activity incited the development of somewhat more expansive fiscal 
and monetary policies. There was one peculiarity, however, in that the low interest rate 
policy kept boosting leverage, while fiscal stimuli were not substantial enough -or well-
oriented  enough-  to  stimulate  aggregate  demand.  Thus,  significant  fiscal  imbalances 
occurred (deficit and public debt).  
The third stage was initiated in early 2010 and has continued until now. In this 
period, we can detect the application of various groups of economic policy measures in the   15 
peripheral  countries  of  the  EU  (some  of  which  have  been  reproduced,  surprisingly,  in 
central  countries).  All  groups  are  different  from  each  other  but  share  their  positioning 
within the different branches of neoclassical economic thinking. Without intending to be 
exhaustive,  the  cocktail  usually  includes  at  least  the  following  elements:  (i)  austerity, 
basically manifested by the reduction in public expenditures;  (ii) supply-side measures, 
including  reforming  the  labour  market,  making  lay-offs  less  expensive,  reinforcing  the 
power  imbalance  between  labour  and  capital  (all  of  which  resulted,  as  expected,  in 
increased unemployment, under-employment, and precariousness); (iii) money cuts in the 
basic elements of the solidarity-based Welfare State System such as reforms of pension 
systems, reductions in the amounts and number of grants available, an increase in public 
university  fees,  a  reduction  of  official  development  assistance,  and  a  reduction  or 
elimination  of  subsistence  benefits;  (iv)  tepid,  partial,  unconnected,  and,  very  often, 
unilateral intervention measures in financial markets, which include the link to Basel III 
agreements,  the creation of the European Fund of Financial Stability, the regulation  of 
some specific financial operations
14, and other measures on the part of stock exchange  
regulators; (v) approaches to institutional reform, although more theoretical than real, with 
the most obvious examples being the discussion concerning the inclusion of the Growth 
and Stability Pact in the treaties, the hypothesis that countries that did not comply would 
lose their right to vote, the approval of the Pact for the Euro, which would prohibit salary 
indexing,  the  delay  of  the  age  of  retirement,  and  the  linking  between  retributions  and 
productivity - without defining, of course, the significance of productivity and focusing the 
debate on the neoclassical concept of unitary labour costs-. In the best case, these economic 
policies have nothing to do with the presence of the three deficits outlined above that are at 
the  root  of  the  differential  impact  of  the  crisis  in  the  Eurozone,  thus  confirming  the 
adherence of the European governments to an economic policy model based on the most 
radical position of neoclassical orthodoxy.  
We find no significant breakthrough in regulating global finance, in fighting tax 
havens,  in  modifying  productive  models,  in  laying  solid  bases  for  another  model  of 
environmentally  sustainable  growth,  or  even in  de-growth. We find no  move toward a 
model of an economic, political, and social union within the EU. Nothing has been done to 
                                                      
14 To this extent, the dexterity with which Germany prepared to forbid short sales of credit default swaps 
in its national market in May 2010 while simultaneously showing (and still showing) a clear inability to 
coordinate specific and concrete regulations with its community partners within the EU area, typically 
illustrates  the  development  of  “every-man-for-himself”  policies.  According  to  our  reasoning,  these 
policies are not compatible with a serious EU project.     16 
address the origin of the problem, that is, the balance of payment imbalances, the operation 
of  deregulated,  liberalised,  and  internationalised  financial  markets,  and  the  income  and 
wealth distribution inequalities
15. The result is that most of th e economic policies raised 
within the European periphery are either superfluous, counterproductive, or irrelevant. 
Naturally, one may wonder whether there are alternatives to the political austerity 
established by the European institutions and almost all n ational governments within EU. 
While answering this question in detail would require a specific paper, we can at least 
isolate some of the major areas that should support an alternative anti-crises policy.  
 
1.- One of the most critical points deals with t he reversal of financialisation and 
dysfunctional financial liberalisation processes,  which would necessarily include a deep 
and systematic re-regulation of international financial markets, based on, at the very least, 
establishing capital controls, increasing supervision and control measures, regulating and 
even forbidding specific financial operations, and establishing a European tax on currency 
transactions, which would be a preliminary step toward imposing a European financial 
transactions tax or even a global financial transactions tax. 
In the EU case, this change should not only lead to control and re -regulation 
processes but, in the short and middle run, seems to make the consideration of more drastic 
alternatives inevitable. At this stage, it appears obvious that the “virtuous circle” -austerity 
through drastic public spending cuts will provoke a painful contraction in the short run but 
will restore the confidence of internal and external private initiatives, leading to a process 
of  productive  resurgence  and  net  capital  inflows-  has  not  occurred.  However,  the 
consequences  of austerity  on production, employment,  and the wellbeing of citizens  of 
Europe‟s peripheries have been dramatic, and confidence has not yet been restored. It is not 
only necessary to abandon the austerity fiscal policy and the extravagant monetary policy 
implemented by the European Central Bank, but the EU may also have to face the fact that 
some peripheral countries will not be able to deal with their debt situations, meaning that at 
least  a partial default (as  Greece second bail out) through debt  restructuring cannot  be 
avoided. This obviously entails transferring at least part of the cost of the adjustment to 
creditors. On the other side, probably some countries should leave the Eurozone, hopefully 
in a non-chaotic way (perhaps in a “soft exit” through the introduction of a two-rate euro 
                                                      
15 In fact, and as we will discuss later, the inspiration for a large part of the adopted policies entails a new 
type of deficit: the democratic one.    17 
zone  via  the  creation  of  a  peripheral  euro  (EUR-P),  with  different  exchange  rates  and 
different monetary and fiscal policies.  
 
2.- A modification of the productive systems that, for many European economies, 
show obvious signs of oversizing for the productive capacity linked to the financial and 
construction  sectors.  This  reorientation  must  be  attached  to  the  development  of  the 
information and communication technology revolution and to the change in the economic 
paradigm  related  to  environmental  sustainability.  This  link  between  the  technological 
economy and the ecological economy is mandatory if we aim to ensure the present and 
future  wellbeing  of  the  people.  That  is  why  the  productive  sectors  that  are  related  to 
alternative  energy  and  associated  with  factors  such  as  fossil-fuels  reduction,  public 
transportation, care and dependence, lifelong permanent education and training, health and 
ICT, etc. must receive incentives and be rewarded with public resources, which entails, 
among other things, reintroducing concepts such as public planning and industrial policy 
into the economic discourse (Crotty, 2009).  
 
3. A reduction in global imbalances. Various global imbalances, though different, 
are  macro  or  microeconomically  related  and  should  be  resolved  or  at  least  tempered 
together.  These  include  (i)  balance  of  payments  imbalances  entailing  the  existence  of 
lingering current account deficits and surpluses. In the specific case of the EU, it proves 
incongruous that Germany should scold its european partners for showing imbalances when 
it bases its own model of growth on the existence and survival of these misalignment on the 
part of its commercial euro-partners; (ii) the contraction of domestic demand at the global 
level  –the  existence  of  which  determines  the  implementation  of  beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies  based  on  the  export-led  growth  model  that  are  at  the  origin  of  the  current 
imbalances previously mentioned – that is linked, to a great extent, to the worsened income 
distribution. In the EU case, and in the short run, it is mandatory to eliminate inoperative 
and  counterproductive  directives  of  the  Pact  for  the  Euro,  to  unmask  the  supposedly 
positive effect of growth policies based on exports (the most famous paladin for which is 
Germany  and  other  central  economies  of  the  Eurozone
16),  and  to  establish  a 
                                                      
16  As  Papadimetrou  et  al.  affirmed  (2010),  Germany‟s  export-led  growth  has  been  based  on  a  strict 
contraction  of  its  labour  costs  (the  same  costs  that  have  been  systematically  growing  in  peripheral 
economies, although they have remained far from the average remuneration in the heart of the Eurozone). 
In this context, the alternative for the European periphery has been to design intense policies of austerity 
and labour cost reductions.    18 
macroeconomic coordination aimed at stimulating internal demand and, over the long run, 
developing a common fiscal policy that necessarily encompasses the centralisation of the 
majority  of  the  tax  resources  in  a  refunded  European  budget;  (iii)  the  inconsistencies 
provoked  by  the  simultaneous  existence  of  flexible  exchange  rates  and  free  capital 
movements, which not only prevent autonomous monetary policies from being developed 
(”Impossible  Trilogy”)  but  also  bestow  all  power  and  options  on  one  party  -the 
international financial markets- and none on the other one -the states- 
17. In the EU case, the 
moment has come to adopt serious and realistic decisions in terms of sovereignty in relation 
to the governance of financial markets, and the implementation of a currency transactions 
tax and other types of capital control appear to be one of the first necessary steps (Arestis, 
Ferreiro and Gomez, 2006; Aziz, 2005; Epstein, 2011; Ocampo, 2011; Schulmeister, 2010; 
Yates, 2009)
18. (iv) Some imbalances in the international financial system, and specifically 
the role played by the USD as its reserve currency, provoke, among others, two biases that 
are  worth  mentioning.  The  first  bias  is  against  countries  with  current  account  deficits 
(except, of course, against the country emitting the reserve currency) that, in times of crisis 
and  when  considering  the  potential  capital  flights  and  a  context  of  difficult  access  to 
external credit, are compelled to reduce their imbalances, whereas countries with surpluses 
are not faced with the same pressure to address their problems. The second bias is against 
developing  countries  that  are  compelled  to  accumulate  reserves  on  industrialised 
economies‟ currencies as a way to protect themselves from a confidence crisis and from 
massive capital flights, which, in the end, implies the existence of net capital flows from 
developing economies toward developed ones. Of the available alternatives for modifying 
the system (return to the gold standard, introduce multiple reserve currencies, establish a 
real asset reserve at the centre of the system -like Special Drawing Rights (SDR), or create 
a Compensation Chamber or a World Reserve Bank that would emit its own currency –in 
the Keynesian bancor way), only the last two have real potential for operation, which is 
why reinforcing the role of SDR in the system seems to be a good preliminary measure 
whether moving towards a system à la bancor or not
19.  
                                                      
17 Moreover, as Wade (2010) pointed out, the combination of flexible exchange rates and free capital 
movements has generated the most damaging evolution for each country at each time: real exchange rate 
appreciations  in  countries  with  current  account  deficits  and  depreciations  in  economies  with  current 
account surpluses.  
18 In relation to this issue, it must be noted that the literature has made a significant change over the past 
decade  from  a  critical  and  sceptical  point  of  view  toward  notable  support,  even  in  mainstream 
publications (Jeanne and Korinek, 2010; Ostry et al., 2010). 
19 See Wray (2009), Papadimitriu et al. (2010) and Ocampo (2010), among others, for a detailed analysis 
of these issues.   19 
 
4.- A reduction in the levels of income and wealth concentration is in the basis of 
the consumption model based on debt and on the global freezing of aggregate demand, 
which, in turn, are some of the key elements explaining the present crises. Again, the EU, 
as a prime example of a well-developed Welfare State System and serving as an example 
for decades of the possibility of combining high levels of private initiative-led growth with 
income and wealth redistribution policies, can temper this dramatic process. In this way, it 
is necessary to make progress towards the harmonisation of direct income and business 
profit  taxes  (for  example,  by  establishing  minimum  marginal  rates),  towards  the 
harmonisation  of  capital  revenue  taxes  (thus  avoiding  the  implementation  of  tax 
competition  policies  that  have  resulted  in  tax  pressure  on  capital  to  reach  suboptimal 
levels), or towards the fight engaged against tax havens (beginning with those located in the 
territories of EU member states) which are drains for illicit and illegal capital flows.  
Thus, it seems mandatory that we advance toward the construction of an authentic 
European  budgetary  policy  that  requires,  as  a  preliminary  step,  designing  a  European 
budget, endowed with resources clearly higher to the present ones, and with expenses that 
will promote the convergence of economies. This would result in the provision of similar 
access to public and social services  within the EU, a coordination of strategies against 
poverty, the development of a true regional European policy, and an increase in the net 
income transfers from high-productivity economies toward the least productive ones
20. 
 
5.- Significant progress in global governance. While the misalignment between the 
main dimension of economic relations (global and/or international) and the dimension in 
which the main political agents operate (national) are one of the basic preoccupations of 
International  Political  Economy,  the  present  crises  have  certainly  honed  in,  with  great 
intensity, on this dysfunctional aspect. Thus, it is mandatory to establish formal or, more 
feasible  and  likely,  informal  international  organisations  to  coordinate  at  a  global  level 
financial and macroeconomic policies, understood as global public goods with weakest-link 
production  technology.  Hence,  financial  and  macroeconomic  policies  are  provided  in  a 
                                                      
20 The structural current imbalances cannot be corrected with austerity and conjectural fiscal adjustment, 
but require aggregate demand and productivity policies, and others that fight against unequal income and 
wealth distribution. In a transitory  way, the  most productive regions should stimulate their domestic 
consumption, modify their export-led growth models, and increase their net transfers toward the least 
productive regions, which should, of course, modify their productive systems beyond the isolated from 
external  competition  sectors  of  weak  demand,increase  their  productivity  (both  capital  and  labour 
productivity), and left behind a model of growth based on resorting to debt. It is, thus, evident that in the 
case of the EU, the Structural Funds have not operated in this way and constitute, de facto, a failure.    20 
clearly inefficient and suboptimal level in the present scenario of “every-man–for-himself”. 
Although the existence of an extended G20 (operating, in practice, with 22 or 23 seats) 
suggests more international representation as compared to the extended G7 (8 seats), both 
its representative function and its operation through a soft institutional system (which is 
certainly one of its strengths in terms of action ability), paradoxically constitute its main 
weaknesses, that is, too many members, absence of binding or sanction mechanisms, and 
difficulty moving from declarations of intention toward action. For this reason, it seems 
necessary to implement measures of reform for the G20 model (if we opt for boosting its 
function  as  a  “world  economic  government”  in  the  shade)  and  establish  some  of  the 
international economic organisations suggested in the literature to manage more specific 
aspects of the international economic (dis)order
21.  
Once again, the EU has the opportunity to present itself (and demonstrate globally) 
that it is more than a selective club for commercial partners by making progress in its 
internal macroeconomic, financial, and fiscal policy coordination, by leading the creation of 
new international organisations, by introducing some o f the most obvious supranational 
measures  that  have  received the  largest  consensus  in  the  economic  literature  (i.e.,  a 
currency  transactions tax , or a  European tax on CO2 emissions), or simply, and as a more 
aesthetic than fundamental point, by attending, in a unitary way and with one voice, G20 
meetings and other international summits.  
 
6.- Other measures laying the groundwork so that the next crises, when they occur, 
will not take us as much by surprise and will have less impact and so that we will be able to 
react earlier, more efficiently, and more fairly. 
There are many policies that could be implemented with goals such as re-educating 
economists;  increasing  ideological  and  methodological  pluralism;  controlling  financial 
markets; reducing the intensity of the incestuous relations between Wall Street and the 
European Cities with the governments at Washington and Brussels; reforming the operative 
principles of central banks, especially the European Central Bank (which is pledged to a 
monetarist fundamentalism and obsessed with inflationist trend while showing disciplined 
indolence, if not open contempt, towards increases in unemployment); fighting offshore 
                                                      
21 The suggestions in this direction are unlimited: a World Tax Organization (Tanzi, 1999), a World 
Financial  Organization  (Eatwell  and  Taylor,  2000;  Eichengreen  2009),  a  World  Development 
Organization  (Jha,  2004),  and  a  World  Tax  and  Financial  Organization  (García-Arias,  2002,  2011), 
among others. See the respective papers for a detailed analysis of their suggestions, justifications, and 
functions.    21 
financial centres and tax havens; and designing a new productive and economic model, 
which first step should be an European Plan for sustainable development.  
 
4.- Democratic deficit and neofeudalism trends as a consequence of the crises 
 
As previously mentioned, one of the key elements of these crisis processes is that 
the implemented (and failed) way of resolution of the financial and economic crises has 
produced political and social (and hence, institutional) crises.  
It has produced a social and institutional crisis because the designed policies of 
austerity have not only failed to solve any of the problems they claimed to solve, but have 
accentuated  the  present  and  future  social  imbalances  in  relation  to  the  distribution  of 
adjustment costs and of income and wealth. By action or by omission, factors such as salary 
moderation, the reduction of social and investment public spending, the renunciation to 
increase  tax  burden  on  the  richest  and  on  capital  incomes,  the  bailout  of  financial 
institutions  (and  their  shareholders  and  executives),  the  increased  flexibility  and 
deregulation  of  the  labour  market,  the  increase  in  education  enrollment  fees  and  the 
diminution of grants and scholarships, the reduction of health and assistance benefits, the 
increase in the age of retirement, and, in general, the policies associated with the Pact for 
the Euro, have set a pessimistic framework for the European Welfare State System and, 
more generally, for equity, justice, and the model of social construction that, at least in 
Europe, has allied, with different levels of success and intensity according to countries and 
times, capitalism and a certain dose of social justice.  
It  has  produced  a  political  and  institutional  crisis  because  the  model  of  (non) 
resolution  of  the  crises  that  has  been  imposed  entails,  de  facto,  the  transfer  of  real 
sovereignty  from  democratically  elected  Parliaments  and  governments  to  international 
financial  markets,  with  or  without  the  cosmetic  mediation  of  intermediaries  with  more 
democratic legitimacy, as is the case with EU institutions. 
In this way, the genesis, evolution, and false resolution of the present crises could 
be laying the foundation for a new model of globalized neofeudalism, understood as a new 
“old social order”, which is closed but global. By close social order we refer (North, Wallis 
and Weingast, 2009) to a system in which small groups of elites have all economic and 
political control over resources, means of production, access to education and culture, and 
political power, and in which an informed mass of individuals live, in relative terms, in an 
economy  of  submission  and  survival.  In  contrast,  an  open  social  order  suggests  the   22 
conjunction  of  three  factors:  political  democracy,  economic  progress,  and  a  formal  or 
informal Welfare State system, with the right to vote and the access to free, universal, and 
quality educational systems as basic elements, respectively, of representative democracy 
and porosity between economic and social classes.  
By deepening the elites‟ power at a global level (in developed economies as well as 
in emerging and developing economies), by demonising compensatory public intervention 
(usually  implemented  by  progressive  taxation  and  social  spending),  by  increasing  the 
deterioration of public education and allowing the emergence of an educative excellence 
that  is  reserved  for  a  minority
22,  by  dismantling  the  Welfare  State  System,  and  by 
overcoming of the “inoperative, populist, inefficient, and out-dated” democratic processes, 
these crises have extremely serious and dramatic consequences for present social, political, 
institutional  and  economic  systems.  Among  the  dire  effects,  this  situation  entails  a 
submission, when designing the economic policy, to the desires and interests of global 
capitalism  and internationalised, liberalised,  and deregulated financial  markets  (with no 
face,  no  democratic  election,  and  no  accountability  for  their  actions  to  Parliaments  or 
citizens). This means that if citizens do not realize this situation and call for the reversal of 
the process, we could be taking the first steps on our way toward a new “old social order”, 
closed but, in this case, global rather than national (which minimises the possibilities of 
escape), with a diluted developed/underdeveloped dichotomy. That is, we would have small 
global groups of elites holding political and economic power and monopolising income and 
productive and educational resources, as opposed to frightened, drowsy, and submissive 
majorities with survival income, casual employment, and the promise of blood, sweat, and 
tears in  order to  reach  a hypothetically better future (which is  already available in  the 
present given the level of available income at the national and world level, but it is always 
postponed as an incentive for individual super-competitiveness) among those who are made 
to believe that they are responsible for their own failures
23, 24. 
                                                      
22 The present economic model, which, contrary to what is assumed, is not just based on the economy of 
knowledge but on the concentration of economic power in a few hands, requires elites with immense 
talent and excellence in education to lead our future and innovate, and some intermediate executives 
(more obedient and frightful than creative) who will do what they are told. Obviously, a massive low-
qualified  workforce  is  also  needed  (semi-enslaved  in  underdeveloped  economies  and  with  no  labour 
rights at the margin of developed ones) to ensure that the least creative and glamorous aspects of the 
machinery work. This model, consequently, requires a dual educational system: a public one for universal 
low-quality education and a private one for those  who can afford higher educational standards. This 
system is based on the super-competitiveness that will encourage the strategies of self-preservation and 
social stratification.   
23 Tautological failure, as success is reserved for the elites, necessarily has to exist in a proportionally 
small fraction of the total population.    23 
The establishment of an apparent soft global governance leaning on the extended 
G20, the globalised financial markets and the existing supranational institutions (IMF, WB, 
EU) pillars is, in fact, a hierarchic, unfair, lawless, antidemocratic, non-equalitarian, and 
everything-but-soft global governance based on control of the elites. It better seems to be a 
fuzzy  global  governance  that,  in  fact,  leads  citizens  toward  a  new  form  of  feudalism 
(neofeudalism) with a global dimension.  
If we focus again on the case of the EU, the current models of crises, and especially 
their differential impacts in the European periphery, clearly show the existence of a very 
significant group of institutional deficiencies. Due to space limits, we will only distinguish 
two of them: (i) the inadequate design of the European construction process, and (ii) the 
fragility and futility of the democratic systems at the very heart of the economies with the 
oldest, and supposedly some of the most consolidated, representative democracies. 
Regarding the first issue, the design of the model of European construction has 
shown, maybe from the beginning, but with no doubt since the Maastricht Treaty, a clear 
aim  to  consolidate  a  purely  mercantile  union  for  which  the  following  steps  have  been 
necessary:  establishing  purely  nominal  convergence  criteria,  establishing  a  merely 
monetary (and obsessed with inflation) union, and establishing fiscal restrictions as those in 
the Stability and Growth Pact or the even more radical measures established in the Pact for 
the Euro. However, all attempts to create an authentic Economic union that would include 
pacts in fiscal, tax, economic regulation financial, or energy policies have been abandoned. 
Similarly, all attempts to establish a Social union, with agreements on European social 
protection, development and consolidation of the Welfare State systems or income policies, 
have also been abandoned. Furthermore, all efforts to create a Political union that would 
establish not only a common voice in foreign policy but would also be able to correct some 
of the democratic deficits that define the present process of European construction have 
been abandoned.  
Moreover, as  for the dramatic events  that have occurred in  the main  peripheral 
European countries since the first Greek bailout, it is clear that the effective control of 
democratic governments is not exerted by citizens nor by national Parliaments or European 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 In some way, this globalized neofeudalism could be understood as the final stage of a process of new 
constitutionalism  of  disciplinary  neo-liberalism  (Gill,  2008),  defined  as  a  “political  project  aimed  at 
anchoring  neo-liberal  policies  of  privatisation,  liberalization  and  pro-market  regulation,  as  well  as 
monetarist objectives, into national and international legal frameworks, insulating these policies from 
normal, day-to-day democratic debate and decision-making” (Lesage and Vermeiren, 2011, 43). 
   24 
institutions
25.  On  the  c ontrary,  the  real  control  of  European  national  governments  is 
exercised by financial markets, speculators, and international creditors, who by assuming 
the function of judges (and parties) to regulate the viability, quality, and stability of national 
economic systems use international financial organizations and European institutions as 
drive belts for their personal interests and decisions. A situation such as the one that 
occurred in Greece (on its second bailout, by the moment), Ireland, Portugal, Spain, or Italy 
cannot be called anything but a process of subversion of democratic systems or, at least, of 
their traditional functioning.  
The pathetic pilgrimage of peripheral countries‟ Ministers and Deputy Ministers of 
Economy to the main international financial marketplaces and their meetings with the staff 
of ultra-liberal newspapers, executives from rating agencies, and some of the most active 
dealers  and  brokers  in  the  design  and  application  of  strongly  destabilising  speculative 
practices,  gives  a  precise  idea  of  who  the  “new  social  agents”  are,  and  to  whom  the 
European countries´ governments are responding for their policies. This transition from 
democratic governments controlled by Parliaments and citizens to governments controlled 
by financial executives and international dealers, indicates that the European democracy 
may  have  made  a  dramatic  turn,  which,  if  not  corrected,  could  give  way  to  a  warded 
pseudodemocratic system
26. 
Evidently, this soft model of democratic subversion does not work or appear to be a 
traditional coup de force; however, it shares with such a coup some of its consequences. 
For example, there is no need to threaten or replace the presidents of democratic nations or 
to  exert  political  or  military  control  over  parties,  media,  trade  unions,  or  societies.  To 
control  economic  policy  it  is  enough  merely  to  warn  the  government  (and  hence,  the 
nation) of the dangers that hover over the country‟s economy (and, thus, threaten political 
and social stability) if the economic measures suggested by international financial markets 
and  orthodox  economists  are  not  adopted,  along  with  an  acceptable  timetable  for  the 
application of the painful reform measures.  
                                                      
25 This, in fact, would be good news as it would mean that progress have been made toward a real 
Political union inside the EU. A Political union that would move, in this hypothetical case, toward the 
wrong direction: austerity, dismantling of the Welfare State, giving up of the fight for interregional and 
interpersonal equity, etc. At least, however, this incorrect trajectory could be corrected and possibly be 
amended by new majorities democratically elected in the future.  
26 In this way, the citizen movements of protest, which have emerged and expanded in Spain, Greece, 
Portugal, Italy, the UK, etc., and the emerging or con solidating of heterodox groups of economists and 
other social scientists, (with their institutional attributes such as societies, congresses, publications, 
pamphlets, post-graduates, etc.), constitute a focus of hope and resistance against the steamroller  of the 
consummate facts in the designing of the anti-crises economic policies, and can constitute the seed for a 
transformation toward a new model of European construction.    25 
It is superfluous to wait for countries to be on the edge of default because of their 
trouble finding funding at a reasonable price on the international financial markets (as in 
the  case  of  Greece,  Ireland,  or  Portugal)  and  then  to  impose  a  group  of  neoliberal 
adjustment measures, as even mentioning the (remote) possibility of such a situation is 
sufficient to result in appropriate action, as evidenced in the case of Spain.  
In  our  opinion,  the  key  moment  is  the  submission  of  the  nation-states  and  of 
supranational  institutions  such  as  the  EU  to  the  elusive  and  erratic  mandates  of  the 
international financial markets. Again, the events that have taken place in Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal are presented as the logical consequence of a de facto situation of insolvency, 
and the requirements of the markets are canalised, which is even more worrying, through 
the voice of European institutions, as if they were the logical petitions of creditors over 
debtors. Again, the case in Spain reveals the real cause of the requirements: Spain shows 
much lower deficit and public debt levels than most of the EU central countries, its banks 
enjoy much fewer worrisome situations than Germany, the UK, France, or Italy. Spain was 
able, until april 2011, to systematically place in markets all of the debt titles it needs, with 
interest rates ranging from 230 to 300 basic points over the German bond. Its pension 
system represents less than 9% of the GDP while, in most European countries, it represents 
more than 10% and reaches 12% to 14% in some central economies. However, the markets 
appear to demand more and more austerity by forcing continuous cuts in public spending, 
reforms of the Welfare State, and an endless list of antisocial measures based on the usual 
myths of neoliberal ideology that are either superfluous or counterproductive in facing the 
essential problems of the Spanish economy, such as the massive unemployment and the 
inability  of  its  productive  network  to  reach  adequate  productivity  levels,  added  to  a 
tremendous problem with tax evasion and underground economy, the inability to reach the 
same levels of income and wellbeing as the central economies of the EU, and a dramatic 
(and growing) duality in income and wealth distribution.  
In  summary,  the  EU,  far  from  confronting  the  financial,  structural,  and  social 
deficits  that  provoked  the  collapse,  has  designed  and  applied  (advised  by  a  group  of 
economists attached to the most radical visions of orthodox economic thought, been at the 
origin of many of the present problems) economic policies that, far from resolving the 
crises, strengthen imbalances and, adding to the deficient political and institutional design 
of the EU, produce a resounding democratic deficit. 
The EU is confronting a challenge of historic proportion and must decide upon its 
path. There are, basically, three options: (i) maintain the statu quo, thereby deepening the   26 
policy  of  austerity,  neighbour  impoverishment,  submission  to  financial  markets,  super-
competitiveness, expansion of social and territorial inequalities, and the Pact for the Euro; 
(ii) end, by different means, the euro project (for instance, by some peripheral economies 
exiting  the  euro  -whether  in  a  programmed,  negotiated  and  controlled  manner  or  by 
abruptly  restructuring  the  debt
27, which implies, in fact,  a partial default –  or  by  the 
establishment  of  a  dual  centre/periphery  euro  system)  with  a  consequent  risk  of 
endangering the European project; or (iii) advance toward an authentic economic, political, 
and social union based on macroeconomic and fiscal coordination (such as an increase in 
the European budget, a harmonisation of direct taxation, a strengthening of regional policy, 
changes in the production model and an Energy and Environment Pact), in the regulation of 
financial  markets  (capital  controls,  taxes  on  currency  transactions,  etc.),  and  in  the 
strengthening of European and global governance (strengthening of European institutions, a 
unitary voice in international organisations, a support for the creation of new supranational 
economic organisations, etc). 
In our opinion, while some of the defining elements of the three routes are not 
incompatible  and  can  exist  simultaneously,  only  advancing  in  the  third  direction  will 
contribute to and support a future of economic stability and social wellbeing in Europe. 
 
5. – Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have analyzed the origin of the current crises as the confluence of 
three serious imbalances that have arisen over the years (in some cases, decades) prior to 
the advent of the crises. Thus, we have outlined three deficits: a financial deficit provoked 
by the process of financialisation and dysfunctional financial liberalisation and its derived 
implications  (such  as  the  oversizing  of  international  financial  markets,  the  presence  of 
distorted  incentives,  deficiencies  in  regulation  and  supervision,  herding  behaviour,  and 
limited and bounded rationality); a structural deficit related primarily to the accumulation 
of international macroeconomic imbalances (such as in the balance of payments, in  the 
design of monetary policies, in the exchange rate system, in export-led growth models, and 
in private indebtedness); and a social and institutional deficit that is founded on the growth 
of  inequalities  in  the  distribution  of  income  and  wealth,  and  on  a  lack  of  significant 
                                                      
27 Differences are extreme. See Lapavitsas et al. (2010) for a detailed analysis.   27 
advances toward global governance or, in the specific case of the EU, on the design of a 
purely mercantilist and monetarist process of European construction. 
The  confluence  of  these  three  elements  has  provoked  a  perfect  storm  within 
developed economies, occurring in a more accentuated form in the EU and in a specific and 
differential  form  in  its  peripheral  economies.  The  evolution  of  this  situation  is  the 
consequence of not only those general elements previously indicated (and specifically of 
the policies of export-led growth designed in  the EU  centre and the policies based on 
leveraging  in  the  periphery,  added  to  the  productive  incapacity  and  excess  private 
indebtedness in these peripheral economies), but also of a dysfunctional and unbalanced 
process of European construction, in which monetary and economic advances have not 
been  accompanied  by  decisive  steps  toward  fiscal,  political,  social,  and  institutional 
integration. 
The severity and intensity of the crises, the analysis of their causes, and the fact that 
they are striking with greater intensity those economies with greater levels of development 
(and, thus, with greater margins of maneuverability), offer the opportunity to ask important 
questions  about  the  economic,  social,  and  institutional  future  and  to  reformulate  the 
economic model (and mainly the orthodox economics one) that is at the origin of these 
events.  Lamentably,  we  are  observing  that  for  these  new  challenges  and  new  crises, 
economic and political leaders are resorting to old policies. That is, they continue to deepen 
the financial, structural, social, institutional, and democratic deficits rather than to pursue 
their resolution and they maintain their commitment to the invocation of the capacity of 
crises victims to sacrifice, to the submission (if not the exaltation) of the victimisers, and to 
the systematic trimming of economic and social rights that have taken decades to achieve. 
Within this path of crises resolution, two elements are especially worrisome. First, it 
is not working. That is, not only is the crises not being resolved but, as one might have 
thought, a worsening of described deficits (the causes) is generating an intensification of 
the problems (the consequences), especially with respect to the loss of employment, an 
increasing of the social fracture, a deepening of financial capitalism and the intensification 
of political and institutional crises. 
Second, this process is creating a new deficit to add to previous ones, that is, a 
democratic deficit. Indeed, the submission, especially in Europe, of national governments, 
international  organisations,  and  European  institutions  to  the  plans  and  interests  of  the 
international financial markets and world economic elites could ultimately configure a new 
“old social order” on a global level: a globalized neofeudalism in which elites have access   28 
to increasing levels of income and wellbeing, while the mass of ex-citizens are condemned 
to fuel the economic process and to consume, but are incapable of influencing political and 
economic decision-making processes as they are led by governments that respond not to 
their Parliaments and citizens but to the aforementioned international financial markets and 
global elites. 
This threat appears to be real and credible, and therefore, it is the responsibility of 
all identified parties to contain and reverse this process by applying a different way of 
crises resolution, by implementing some of the proposals discussed above and by returning 
the  political  decision-making  capacity  to  the  national  governments,  the  democratic 
supranational institutions (like a reoriented EU), the Parliaments, and the citizens. And it is 
imperative  to  control  and  regulate  international  financial  markets  and  leave  behind  old 
mainstream  economists´  advices  (both  at  the  origins  of  the  current  crises).  A  fair  and 
efficient evolution of the economy and the future wellbeing of the European (and hence, 
world) population dramatically depends on it. 
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